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The doctrine of exhaustion denies IPR owners the right to control subsequent sales of patented, 
copyrighted or trademarked products after they have been placed on the market with the consent of 
the right owner. Exhaustion rules therefore inevitably interfere with the right owner’s exclusive 
market position, as they reduce his leeway for price differentiation and expose him to intensified 
price competition. The study analyzes to which extent such interference can be justified in the light 
of the different economic natures of patents and design rights, copyrights and trademark rights. The 
author of this article has been a visiting scholar at the Institute of Innovation Research (IIR) at 
Hitotsubashi University from March to June 2005. Special thanks go to Prof. Sadao Nagaoka (IIR) 
for his kind supervision and for his helpful comments on this article. All errors and omissions, 
however, remain on the author. 
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Exhaustion of IP Rights: Reflections from Economic Theory 
© Peter Ganea 
 
I. General Remarks     
 
This article deals with the exhaustion of patents, copyrights and trademark rights, one of 
the most heatedly debated IP-related topics. The core question is whether a patent, 
copyright or trademark right entitles its owner to prevent the further circulation of goods 
incorporating his IP after they were put into circulation with his consent. Does a patent 
entitle its owner to prohibit the import of patented goods from a country in which they 
were legally sold by a licensee and legally purchased by the importer? Can a foreign 
film producer prevent the import of legally sold video cassettes or DVDs of a 
cinematographic work in a country in which the same film is still shown in the movie 
theatres? Can the owner of a famous trademark prevent legal purchasers of goods 
bearing his trademark from selling them independently of established distribution 
channels?  
The terms “Patent exhaustion”, “trademark exhaustion” etc. mean that the right to 
control further market distribution has ceased to exist upon first legal sale, not that the 
IP as a whole has exhausted. The owner of the copyright in a video game, for example, 
may still proceed against the unauthorized commercial display and performance of his 
games in a gaming arcade, as the right to perform the work in the public subsists even 
after the legal sale of the video game copies.
1  Subject to exhaustion is only the right to 
control subsequent circulation of a legally sold item.   
                                                  
1  Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989).  3
The exhaustion problem is of special relevancy when it comes to international trade 
in goods which incorporate IP rights. Different national average incomes prompt right 
owners to differentiate the price for one and the same good, and such price 
differentiation invites thirds to purchase such goods where they are sold at a cheap price 
and to resell them where consumers are charged a high price, thereby arbitraging away 
international price differences.
2 Should trade in such goods, which is widely known as 
“parallel imports”, be permitted or not? The actual international conventions on patent, 
trademark and copyright protection, e.g. the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO, leave 
the answer to this question to their member states, and an international consent is not 
yet in sight. The international exhaustion problem remains one of the most vividly 
discussed IP issues between the developed and the underdeveloped world. Whereas the 
former fear a flood of cheap commodities to the detriment of national industry and 
employment, the latter argue that a prohibition of parallel imports would form a de-facto 
trade barrier that prevents developing countries from tapping their comparative 
advantage of cheap labor.
3 
However, also on the domestic market, the permissibility of re-circulating goods that 
have been put into circulation with the consent of the right owner is under discussion. 
One example is the independent sale of so-called Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM-) software, i.e. software bundled with hardware and sold at a much cheaper price 
than the price charged for the isolated program versions.
4  
                                                  
2  More about monopolistic price differentiation below. 2. b). 
3  Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade - Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 IIC 534 (1998). 
4 According to a decision of the German Federal Court, such OEM software copies are first 
circulated when they are sold to the authorized distributors, so that the distribution right in them does 
not extend to subsequent sale to retailers or end users. The latter would be free to distribute the 
copies without adhering to the sales conditions prescribed by the copyright owner (decision of 6 July 
2000, Zeitschrift fuer Urheber- und Medienrecht 2000, 1079).    4
The sometimes emotional exchange of arguments obstructs the analysis of the core 
problem, namely whether and to what extent intellectual property exhaustion impairs 
the essence of patent, copyright and trademark rights. This study aims at developing a 
general framework that integrates the interests of both right owners in an adequate 
reward for their creative efforts and the public in the availability of high-value 
commodities at cheap prices.   
 
 
II. Patent Exhaustion   
 
1. Legal Concepts…   
 
The explanations in this subchapter will outline the present legal theories with respect to 
patent exhaustion, which were partly developed by scholars, partly by the judiciary, in 
short. We may roughly distinguish between two legal schools:
5  
One regards exhaustion as a natural limitation to the patent law. It is mainly 
grounded on the so-called “reward theory”, according to which the patent owner has 
obtained an equitable award upon first sale. There would be no reason to allow him to 
reap further benefits by a control right over the subsequent circulation. In other words, 
by granting the patent owner the opportunity to put the patented product exclusively on 
the market, the objective of patent protection has been met. Further acts of circulating 
the patented product would no more affect the specific subject-matter of the patent right. 
Another justification for the exhaustion of patent rights often referred to in this context 
                                                  
5  Explained in detail by C. Heath, Legal Concepts of Exhaustion and Parallel Imports, in: C. Heath,  5
is the “theory of safeguarding market circulation”, according to which a right to control 
subsequent acts of market circulation would raise insecurity as to which extent the 
market participants may dispose of their legally purchased property and thereby 
jeopardize the smooth market circulation. Patent exhaustion as a limitation to the patent 
right is accepted by the majority of important legislations, including the U.S. and 
Continental Europe.   
However, the majority of legislations restrict exhaustion to the national level. With 
regard to international exhaustion, the majority of national and regional legislations 
adhere to the principle that a legal sale abroad shall have no effect on the right to market 
the patented product domestically, so that the patent right can be exercised against the 
inflow of products produced and marketed e.g. under a license abroad. From a legal 
perspective, a patent constitutes a territorial right, meaning that its grant, invalidation 
etc. in one country has no effect on the treatment and fate of a parallel patent for the 
same invention in another country. Therefore, also the legal exploitation of the patented 
technology on one domestic market shall not limit the scope of its exercise on the other 
domestic market. In prescribing Community-wide “regional” exhaustion, the EU has 
somehow softened this principle in order to realize a barrier-free internal market, even 
though patent harmonization within the EU is still on the way.   
The other school of thought, the so-called “implied license doctrine”, is of British 
origin and applied in many Common-Law countries. It basically leaves the extent to 
which a product can be re-circulated upon first legal sale to the decision of the right 
owner respectively to the agreement concluded with his licensee. Just as the owner of a 
material commodity, the patent owner may decide whether to dispose of his immaterial 
                                                                                                                                                  
Parallel Imports in Asia, Kluwer Law International 2004, 13 et seq.  6
property once and for all or whether to entrust its exploitation under certain restrictions. 
Accordingly, the right owner may for example oblige his licensee in another country to 
mark the patented product with a sign that sale is restricted to that country and may not 
be traded to another country. Such a mark would not only be effective against the 
immediate licensee but also ban third purchasers from reselling the marked products 
outside the limits indicated by that mark. Sale of unmarked goods instead would imply 
that the right owner has consented in unrestricted resale (“implied license”).   
The implied license doctrine enjoys increasing popularity in Japan and China, both 
countries without a Common Law tradition. In its famous “BBS” decision of 1 July 
1997 on parallel imports,
6 the Japanese Supreme Court, for example, stated that “...a 
domestic patentee who markets patented products abroad and wishes to exclude their 
sale and use in our country by subsequent purchasers, has to make clear his intention of 
such a restriction when dealing with the transferee, and has to clarify such restriction on 
the patented goods for the benefit of subsequent purchasers.” In absence of such a 
clarifying mark on the product, priority must be given to international trade.   
China’s Supreme People’s Court has not yet had the opportunity to make a 
corresponding judgment, but in anticipation of future cases, it has inserted a 
precautionary rule in Item 94 of its draft set of detailed interpretation rules on the 
application of law to patent infringement cases, which, however, is still under discussion. 
With regard to the international exhaustion, it states that the patent right shall be deemed 
exhausted upon first sale unless the licensing contract contains a clause that restricts the 
sales territory.   
 
                                                  
6  29 IIC 331 (1998)  7
 
2. ... and Economic Theory   
 
a) The economic importance of patents   
Freshmen in economics learn that perfect price competition is the competition form that 
generates the highest possible welfare. Their reference model is the “model of perfect 
competition”. It shows that welfare, i.e. the aggregation of the so-called consumers’ 
surplus, i.e. the advantage for those consumers who would have paid a higher price than 
the given market price, and the producers’ surplus, i.e. the advantage of those producers 
who would be able to sell the product at a lower price than the given market price, is on 
an optimum level if the market is perfectly competitive.     
  Perfect market competition means that the market price is the result of 
innumerous market transactions, i.e. that it is taken for given by all market participants 
and not manipulated by a single player. A single supplier on the market would be able to 
actively set a price according to the consumers’ readiness to pay, thereby eating up a 
part of the consumers’ surplus and offering a reduced supply at higher prices.
7  
However, perfect competition is only possible under a number of very restrictive 
preconditions. It requires, inter alia, an atomistic market structure, i.e. a huge number of 
players so that no single player can manipulate the market price. Moreover, the goods 
traded on the market must be completely homogenous. A good that attracts consumers 
by unique qualitative features would result in an exclusive position of its supplier and 
allow him a certain pricing leeway. According to the perfect competition model, 
however, all situations in which single producers can actively set prices instead of 
                                                  
7 With regard to monopolistic price formation, see Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics (5
th ed.  8
taking a market price for given are sub-optimal. A part of the consumers’ surplus will be 
eaten up without compensating such loss by a corresponding increase in the producer’s 
surplus. Therefore, the total aggregate of consumers’ and producers’ surplus decreases.
8 
In our real world, however, situations of perfect competition are quite rare. 
Especially the assumption of complete homogeneity of goods does not match today’s 
reality. It may have been realistic in times in which mainly agricultural products and 
natural resources were objects of market transactions, but it does not fit to our present 
markets in which sophisticated and qualitatively diverse goods are traded. The sole 
answer that the model can give to this deviation from what it considers “perfect” is that 
the innovative step incorporated in a unique commodity be immediately imitated by the 
competitors. The weak point of the model of perfect competition becomes obvious – it 
can only demonstrate the welfare effect of pure price competition but it remains silent 
on welfare enhancement by long-term competition in terms of quality and innovation. 
Patent protection eliminates this weak point. Economically, it can be explained as the 
acceptance of one market failure, namely a monopolistic pricing leeway that results 
from the exclusive right to market a certain commodity,
9 in order to eliminate another 
market failure, namely free riding on innovative efforts, which will sooner or later 
diminish any incentive on the supply side to be competitive in terms of quality and 
innovation. The inefficiency of such free-riding can also be demonstrated by the model 
of perfect competition: accordingly, the gratis supply of other market participants with 
results of innovative or creative effort amounts to a so-called positive externality. An 
                                                                                                                                                  
1999) W.W. Norton & Co. New York, London, 416 et seq.   
8  Varian, (above note 7), 422 et seq.     
9 Some commentators deny patents the character of monopoly rights – see e.g. Pretnar, The 
Economic Impact of Patents in a Knowledge-Based Market Economy, 34 IIC 887 (2003). According 
to economic theory, however, any pricing-leeway forms a deviation from perfect competition and 
logically amounts to a monopolistic situation. In other words, the fact that patent owner is in the  9
internalization of the externality in form of a right to be rewarded would enable the 
supplier to enhance his supply to an extent that meets the real demand for it. What the 
model of perfect competition cannot explain, however, are the long-term consequences 
of such an unrewarded effort, namely that sooner or later, any incentive to be 
competitive in terms of innovation and creativity will disappear.     
It should be noted, however, that the grant of a patent does not mean permission to 
unrestricted monopolistic pricing. Apart from rare cases in which no substitute can be 
found on the respective market, the patent owner is normally disciplined by the 
availability of alternative, yet qualitatively differing goods of the same category, so that 
he cannot fully escape price competition. 
 
b) Price differentiation by the patent owner – an “unfair” discrimination?   
As exclusive supplier, the monopolist can dictate prices according to the demand’s 
willingness to pay. If the willingness to pay is varying among different consumer groups, 
he will try to differentiate prices and charge each consumer group a price that 
corresponds to its willingness to pay. Price differentiation enables him to skim a higher 
proportion of the consumer surplus than in case of uniform price setting. In the ideal 
case, each consumer will be charged the price that he is ready to pay, but normally, such 
“perfect price discrimination” is impossible, as the individual consumer will not reveal 
his real willingness to pay. Therefore, price differentiation is normally restricted to 
differentiation according to consumer groups (so-called third-degree price 
differentiation).
10  
The demand’s willingness to pay depends on the so-called price elasticity of demand, 
                                                                                                                                                  
position to differentiate prices evidences that the patent right amounts to a monopoly.          10
that is, the extent to which the demand reacts to a change in the price of a given 
commodity. A high elasticity indicates that the demand can easily switch to another 
commodity in case of a price increase. It can also mean that the further purchase of that 
commodity would use up to too much of the income of the household, so that it has no 
other choice but to refrain from further purchase. The monopolist will charge a 
relatively low price from such consumer groups. Low price elasticity instead indicates 
that the consumers do not have a choice to switch to or that their average income is high 
enough to cope with the price increase. The monopolist may therefore charge a higher 
price.
11  
Without doubt, such price differentiation discriminates against those who are willing 
to pay a relatively high price. However, in comparison with a uniform monopoly price, 
it can enhance welfare, when it enables the supply of those consumers who would not 
have been able to afford the commodity at that uniform price. Why should therefore 
patent owners, as exclusive right owners endowed with a certain pricing leeway by law, 
only be allowed to set a uniform price but not to differentiate prices? The supporters of 
far-reaching exhaustion rules state that by fostering arbitrage, the monopolistic pricing 
leeway of patent owners will be reduced, with the result of a better supply at cheaper 
prices. This view might be justified with regard to “undesired” monopolists who 
overcharge consumers in an abusive manner, but do patent owners really abuse their 
market power when they exploit a pricing leeway which results from the grant of an 
exclusive right? Do they really have to be “disciplined”?   
Far-reaching exhaustion rules expose the patent owner to price competition on the 
market for which the patent is granted. Such intensified price competition through the 
                                                                                                                                                  
10 See  Varian (above note 7), 434 et seq.    11
sale of products bearing his own technology will have a negative impact on the profit 
that he can gain when putting the patented product into circulation.   
Therefore, it can hardly be assumed that the patent owner has had the opportunity to 
obtain an “adequate reward” upon first circulation, in that the objective of patent 
protection has been met and subsequent sale would no more affect the specific 
subject-matter of patent protection.   
 
c) International exhaustion and trade theory 
The most relevant form of price differentiation with respect to patented products is 
international price differentiation. Here, the patent owner differentiates prices according 
to different average national income levels. Should he be deprived of this opportunity to 
exploit his monopoly by international exhaustion? As already mentioned in the 
introductory remarks, the supporters of an international exhaustion refer to the welfare 
effect of unrestricted international trade in terms of a better international supply at lower 
costs.  
Economically, the welfare effect of international trade can be demonstrated by the 
so-called model of comparative advantages. It observes two countries, each of them 
producing the same two commodities. One of these countries enjoys an absolute 
productivity advantage, meaning that it is able to produce both commodities at higher 
productivity than the other country. Even in such case, one product can be produced at 
relatively low costs in the one country, and in the other country it is just the other way 
round. The model of comparative advantages now evidences that in spite of the fact that 
one country enjoys an absolute productivity advantage, trade between both countries 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 Ibid.   12
makes sense, as it enables each country to concentrate on the commodity it can produce 
at relatively low costs. In other words, international division of labour results in a better 
supply at lower prices on each national market.   
However, also the model of comparative advantages cannot be unrestrictedly applied 
to our real world. It explains a situation in which the immediate reason for international 
price differences is cost differences. It starts from the assumption that the prices on each 
national market result from perfect competition and remains silent on other factors of 
influence like the existence of monopolies, different institutional preconditions and the 
like on price formation. In other words, it basically starts from the same restrictive 
assumptions as the model of perfect competition. Therefore, it cannot simply be applied 
to a situation in which not only different factor endowments but also the exclusive right 
to market a certain product is decisive for international price differences.
 12  
 
d) The necessity of safeguarding market circulation 
It cannot be ignored that controlling the re-circulation of patented products causes costs, 
which consist in the insecurity of legal purchasers as to which extent they may freely 
dispose of their property without offending against the law. Here, it must be kept in 
mind that patent protection does not end in itself but that its objective is to enhance 
welfare. A patent system that exposes market participants to a high degree of 
uncertainty may reduce entrepreneurial activity, raise hedge losses and reduce welfare. 
This argument is basically consisted with the above-mentioned “theory of safeguarding 
                                                  
12 The quite simple model of comparative advantages, which was developed by Ricardo in 1817, 
has undergone subsequent modifications and refinements, so by the Factor-Proportions Model of 
Heckscher and Ohlin that includes different national endowments with the factors labor and capital 
in its observations, or by the Stolper-Samuelson-Theorem that allows conclusions with regard to 
changes in factor prices (labor and capital) due to the changes in output entailed by the transition 
from autarky to trade. All these modifications, however, give us no further hint on possible effects  13
market circulation”, pursuant to which exhaustion rules are necessary to secure the 
smooth  circulation  of  goods.     
In sum, from an economic perspective, the theory of safeguarding market circulation 
turns out to be the only tenable justification for exhaustion rules. Rules based on this 
theory should emanate from a consideration whether the beneficial effect of reduced 
uncertainty outweighs the possible incentive incompatibilities arising from a reduced 
pricing leeway. We may assume that within a national or largely integrated regional 
market, the costs of keeping up prevention mechanisms against parallel trade against an 
in other respects free flow of commodities are considerably high. In other words, the 
more “abnormal” trade barriers especially established to prevent parallel trade appear 
within an in any other respects integrated and uniform market environment, the more 
convincing is the call for an exhaustion rule. On the other hand, the more national 
markets are isolated from each other, the less costly can prevention measures against 
parallel trade be assumed, not at least because national boundaries are “natural” trade 
barriers that partition single unified market areas from each other. Here, the social 
benefit arising from undistorted price differentiation, namely incentives to be 
competitive in terms of innovation and quality, is likely to outweigh the remaining 
insecurity costs resulting from trade barriers against parallel imports.     
 
e) Some thoughts on the “implied license” doctrine 
As already mentioned, English law has developed the so-called “implied license” theory 
pursuant to which the patent owner is deemed to have given his consent into 
unrestricted resale of his product unless he has clearly declared that distribution outside 
                                                                                                                                                  
that the existence of IP rights may have on the welfare that free trade is assumed to generate.        14
established channels is not permitted. English law requires such declaration of will to be 
in form of a mark on the product (not only in the license contract etc.) so as to inform 
potential re-distributors about the sales restriction. However, why should the owner of 
the patent have an interest in not indicating a mark that resale is prohibited? One reason 
can be the so-called double marginalization problem: an exclusive local distributor may 
sell his products at a price that contravenes the sales policy of the right owner, in that it 
significantly reduces the output the right owner. In such case, the original right owner 
can be interested in disciplining his distributors by allowing limited intra-brand 
competition.
13  At a first glance, to privatize the exhaustion problem by leaving it to the 
decentralized decision autonomy of the market players appears quite appealing, because 
it widens the scope of contractible subject-matter and reduces regulatory interference 
into the market. 
However, a closer look reveals some significant weaknesses of this solution. One is 
of rather practical nature. Third potential resellers are not involved in the contract 
between the right owner and can therefore hardly be expected to know whether the right 
owner has allowed resale or not. The only feasible way to inform them in a manner that 
does not cause unreasonable search costs to them is to attach a declaration of will 
directly on the product, indicating the territorial extent to which re-circulation of the 
product is allowed. However, even such a declaration of will may be expressed in a 
hazy and misleading manner, as common standards for such marking are widely absent. 
Second, the attachment of such a mark and its content may result from a contractual 
agreement between the right owner and his local licensee, distributor etc. and therefore 
                                                  
13Gallini/Hollis, A Contractual Approach to the Grey Market, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1(10 et 
seq.),with special regard to intra-brand competition between products bearing the same trademark. 
Their findings, however, are mutatis mutandis applicable to the patent exhaustion problem. The 
question of trademark exhaustion is treated in Chapter IV.        15
from a bilateral bargaining monopoly in which only two parties decide about the terms 
and conditions of allocating a patent right. The result of their bilateral bargaining, 
however, reduces the room for manoeuvre of third parties who had no opportunity to 
bring in their own views. In the light of these uncertainties and insufficiencies, a clear 
(though reasonably justified) exhaustion rule to which all market participants have to 
adhere in the same manner appears to be preferable over privatizing the exhaustion 
problem by leaving its solution to individual decision-making.
14   
 
 
3. Intermediate results 
 
So far, the observations have brought the following to light:   
a)  The “reward theory” according to which the patent owner has had the opportunity to 
obtain an “adequate reward” upon first sale does not convince, as it disregards that 
due to arbitrage, the “adequate reward” will sooner or later be reduced by intensified 
price competition through sale of products bearing his own technology.           
b)  The same applies to the “free trade argument” raised in context with parallel imports, 
as it imposes a model developed under the assumption of perfect price competition 
on a situation in which competitors are deliberately exempted from price 
competition.   
c)  To a certain extent, exhaustion rules are justified in the light of the “theory of 
safeguarding market circulation”. It considers that an unrestricted right to control 
                                                  
14 See  also  Yusuf/Moncayo von Hase, Intellectual Property Protection and International Trade – 
Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, 16 No.1 World Competition Law and Economics Review (1992), 
115.  16
further acts of distributing legally sold products creates obstacles to the free 
movement of commodities and therefore increases hedge losses and costs of 
uncertainty. These costs can be deemed unduly high in case of an in other respects 
largely integrated market. Here, exhaustion rules make sense. The “theory of 
safeguarding market circulation”, however, is less compelling as justification for the 
international exhaustion. 
d)  Finally, the “implied license” doctrine, on the first glance an alluring alternative to 





III. Copyright Exhaustion 
 
1. The Economic Function of Copyright and its Treatment in Legal Reality 
 
Traditionally, subject to exhaustion under copyright is the “distribution right”, i.e. the 
right to put material copies of the work like CDs, books, tapes etc. into circulation. That 
the distribution right has exhausted, however, does not mean that the legal purchaser 
may exploit his work exemplar in any thinkable manner. Only the distribution right has 
exhausted upon first sale, but not e.g. the right to communicate the content of a legally 
purchased CD to the public by making it available on the internet or playing it in a 
discotheque. On the international stage, a comprehensive distribution right in all 
categories of works such as in performances and phonograms was first introduced into  17
the World Copyright Treaty and the World Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 
1996. Both treaties, however, leave the exhaustion issue to national regulation by the 
member states.   
The economic function of copyright is not much different from that of patents. Also a 
copyright entitles its owner to exclusively market an item that incorporates his work, 
which can be a book, a CD but also an artistically designed perfume flacon. Therefore, 
the above explanations with regard to patent exhaustion can be similarly applied to the 
exhaustion of the copyright distribution right. In other words, neither the “reward 
theory” nor the “free trade argument” can justify copyright exhaustion rules, as they 
expose the owner of a legal monopoly to pure price competition through sale of 
products incorporating his own work, which will sooner or later reduce the “adequate 
reward” obtained upon first circulation, and also the implied license doctrine turns out 
to be economically inefficient, as it imposes the result of bilateral bargaining on third 
market participants. Just as in case of patents, there remains only one tenable argument 
in favour of copyright exhaustion, namely the mentioned “theory of safeguarding the 
free market circulation”.   
Even in countries like Germany, where copyright is rather perceived as a 
non-disposable right of the individual author than as a market instrument, it is 
commonly accepted that copyright must be subject to certain limitations in order to 
safeguard social welfare. In a decision of 4 May 2000 regarding the unauthorized poster 
reproduction of copyrighted perfume flacons for promoting their re-circulation outside 
the channels established by the copyright owner, the German Federal Court even 
subjected the reproduction right to the exhaustion doctrine set forth in Sec. 17 of the  18
German Copyright Act,
15 stating that copyright as a whole (and therefore not only the 
distribution right) must take second place to the interest in the marketability of the 
copyrighted goods.
16  
How is copyright exhaustion treated in legal practice of other countries? As already 
mentioned, the international rules leave the exhaustion issue to national legislation. The 
European Union makes use of this freedom to protect the Internal Market against cheap 
imports from abroad. A number of copyright-related EU Directives
17 contain slightly 
differently worded provisions which, however, are commonly interpreted as allowing 
exhaustion only within the Internal Market, i.e. as prohibiting parallel imports of CDs, 
books etc. from third countries. The clearest provision is contained in Art. 4(2) of the 
Information Society Directive of 2001, pursuant to which "the distribution right shall 
not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, 
except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that 
object is made by the right holder or with his consent." In the light of the above 
argument that spatial price differentiation increases welfare by enabling the supply of 
low-income consumer groups, even EU-wide exhaustion appears questionable, given 
the huge differences in national incomes, especially after the EU accession of a number 
of Eastern European countries in the course of the 2004 enlargement. However, the EU 
pursues the higher-ranking political goal of establishing a unified European market 
without any trade barriers, in which a control right over subsequent parallel trade upon 
first sale within the Community would hardly be acceptable. The motive behind 
                                                  
15  Pursuant to Sec. 17 of the Copyright Act, the distribution right exhausts upon first sale within the 
European Community – on Community-wide exhaustion, see (2). 
16 32 IIC 717 (2001) The Federal Court, however, explicitly denied a direct exhaustion of the 
reproduction right. It only banned the copyright owner from exercising it in order to circumvent the 
legal exhaustion of the distribution right.         
17 On computer programs (1991), on the rental right (1992), on database protection (1996) and on  19
prohibiting its members to allow parallel imports from third countries, which is 
apparently a political one, namely to protect the European film, music and software 
industry against cheap imports from abroad, should not be discussed as it is of little 
relevance for our theoretical observations. In the light of the mentioned objective to 
establish a unified market, however, it is certainly justified not to leave it to each 
member state to formulate its own exhaustion policy with regard to third countries, but 
to prescribe a common regime. Otherwise, CDs, DVDs, books etc parallel imported into 
member states which opted for international exhaustion would be banned from 
subsequent importation into those members which prohibit parallel imports, which 
would result in a new trade barrier within the EU.
18  In sum, the treatment of copyright 
exhaustion in the EU comes quite close to the results of our economic observations, 
namely that exhaustion rules make sense within a largely integrated market area but not 
on the international stage. However, this treatment is not based on considerations 
regarding the economic importance of copyright but rather on the motive to erect a 
“fortress Europe”, with far-reaching circulation freedom within its boundaries and 
protectionism against price competition from outside.   
Among the IP codes of the U.S., the Copyright Act is the only one that provides for 
an explicit exhaustion rule. Sec. 109 (a) contains a provision which is generally known 
as “first sale doctrine”. It is based on a Supreme Court decision of 1908
19 which 
regarded the right to put work copies into circulation (“to vend”) as a necessary 
supplement to the right to make copies and not as a right that could be independently 
exercised against recirculation upon first legal sale. Case law with regard to 
                                                                                                                                                  
copyright in the information society (2001)   
18  Von Lewinski, International Exhaustion of the Distribution Right Under EC Copyright Law, 
E.I.P.R. 2005 27(7), 233.   
19  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339.      20
international exhaustion is ambiguous, however. The majority of decisions since the 
1980ies regard parallel imports of copyrighted products as infringing the importation 
right in Sec. 602 of the Copyright Act,
20 and it remains doubtful whether the Supreme 
Court’s “Quality King” decision of 9 March 1998
21, which allowed parallel imports of 
copyrighted goods, really entailed a change to this view. It dealt with the special case of 
a product originally produced in the U.S. and exported to the U.K. where the defendant 
purchased it at a cheap price and re-imported it to the U.S. The Supreme Court based its 
reasoning on the wording of Sec. 109 (a) pursuant to which the first sale doctrine would 
apply to products “lawfully made under this title”, which it obviously interpreted as 
“made in the U.S.” Products lawfully made abroad (e.g. under a license) would 
therefore not fall under the first sale doctrine, and the importation right in Sec. 602 
would remain applicable. In sum, U.S. case law gives no further hint on how to view at 
the first sale doctrine in the light of economic theory but is rather based on the 
interpretation of legal provisions.     
If we take a final look at the Japanese Copyright Act, we find a quite clear provision 
on copyright exhaustion. Sec. 26-2 provides for a “right in ownership transfer”, 
meaning a right to distribute the work original or copies that exhausts upon first 
circulation. It was introduced in 1999 in response to the WCT which requires a 
distribution right but leaves the exhaustion issue to the members. Excluded from 
exhaustion are cinematographic works. Their owners enjoy a more comprehensive 
“distribution right” (Sec. 26), which was already introduced in 1970 and originally 
intended as a non-exhaustive right. Due to the special pattern of traditional film 
                                                  
20 E.g. Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. Scorpio Music Distributors 569 F.Supp 47 (E.D. Pa. 
1983) aff’d mem., 738 F.2d. 424 (3d Cir. 1984)   
21  118 S.Ct. 1125 (1998)  21
exploitation in form of renting or otherwise circulating only a few copies among movie 
theatres, film producers should be indirectly protected against unauthorized showing by 
a control right over the circulation of their film rolls. However, in the meantime, also 
producers of audiovisual subject-matter like films stored on video cassettes which are 
exploited in the same manner as books and CDs, namely through mass sale of items for 
individual use, claim to be film producers and to enjoy the non-exhaustive “distribution 
right” in Sec. 26.
22  In order to rectify this unbalanced situation, the Supreme Court in a 
decision of 25 April 2002 interpreted the “distribution right” as exhaustive with regard 
to computer games and permitted the second-hand-sale of legally purchased games, 
even though it still regarded video games as falling under “cinematographic works”.
23 
In this context, the court also stated that a non-exhaustible right would jeopardize the 
free movement of goods and allow the right owner to obtain an unnecessary double 
reward. In sum, the Japanese trend towards a liberal regime over trade in copyrighted 
goods is evident. However, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is not only based on the 
cognition that the market must be kept free of obstacles, but also on the view that 
copyright owners do not deserve a “double reward”, an argument that has proved 
untenable in the observations regarding patent exhaustion.       
 
 
2. On the Feasibility of the So-called Online Exhaustion 
 
Whereas the online submission of films, music, software and texts against payment has 
                                                  
22 See e.g. the “Beauty and the Beast” decision of the Tokyo District Court of 1 July 1995, 27 IIC 
570 (1996).   
23  35 IIC 467 (2004), comment by Ganea.  22
become a common form of copyright transactions, the application of the exhaustion 
doctrine is still restricted to the right to put work materializations like CDs or books into 
circulation. To a number of commentators, it appears quite odd that the exhaustion 
doctrine allows the resale of CDs or books bought at the sales counter whereas an 
individual who has ordered the same content via the internet and downloaded on a 
material carrier is banned from the sale of copies of his download, just because the 
content was not “distributed” to him but transmitted.
24  
A substantial difference between traditional store and online sale becomes only 
evident if we distance ourselves from the subjective view of the work purchaser and 
recall that the only tenable justification for exhaustion rules we have found is the need 
to safeguard the free circulation of commodities. In case of store sale, it is commonly 
accepted that only third parties like independent retailers or end users may freely 
dispose of purchased work copies, but not e.g. the directly authorized licensor or 
distributor. He is bound to the conditions regarding territory of sale etc. imposed by the 
right owner. The distribution right in work copies circulated in offence against such 
contractual rules is not regarded as exhausted, as the copies are not put into circulation 
with the right owner’s consent. However, in case of internet sale, the immediate 
transaction partner to the copyright owner is no more a commercial distributor but the 
end user himself. Why should the right owner in this case be banned from imposing 
limitations on subsequent use, e.g. in form of a click-wrap agreement?   
Unlike traditional store sale in form of transferring ownership in an item bearing 
protected contents, sale via internet rather resembles a permission to use than “sale” in 
the traditional sense, even if the purchaser is allowed to make a copy of the program on 
                                                  
24 E.g. Knies, Erschoepfung Online? (Exhaustion Online?), GRUR Int. 2002, 314; Eric Tjong Tjin  23
his hard disk, and unlike the subject-matter of store sale, the subject-matter of online 
transactions is not “commodities” incorporating protected contents but the protected 
contents as such. In other words, in case of online transmission, no goods are “put into 
circulation” with the consent of the right owner and a “movement of goods” that could 
be jeopardized by a control right over subsequent acts of circulating protected contents 
does not occur.   
It should not remain unmentioned that a click-wrap permission to use is far from a 
real contractual agreement that expresses the will of both parties, as the right owner 
rather imposes his use conditions on the purchaser. Abidance to them is secured by 
technological protection measures. They render such uses impossible which were 
originally permitted by limitation rules but they cannot be circumvented without 
offending against copyright. On the other hand, copyright limitations (such as the 
exhaustion rule) emerged at a time when the prevailing exploitation patterns did not 
allow to control the private use of legally purchased work carriers. The legislature 
accepted the inevitable, permitted such non-controllable private uses and partly 
introduced collective compensation systems of “rough justice” character, so for example 
levies imposed on equipment with audio or audio-visual recording function, regardless 
of whether the single purchaser really used it for recording protected contents.   
The internet reduces such inefficient rough justice, in enabling the supply side to 
meet individual demands better than ever before by way of price and product 
differentiation. A few years ago, a consumer had to buy a whole CD if he wanted to hear 
a certain title, together with a dozen or more other unwanted pieces. The internet 
enables him to download only the preferred content at a correspondingly cheap price. In 
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the near future, the already technically possible “pay-per-view” or “pay-per-listening” - 
forms of copyright transaction will open an even broader variety of online copyright 
transactions. In other words, that form of copyright transactions which results in a 
durable copy of contents identical to the CD, DVD or book available at the sales 
counter is only one amongst many others, and the end user has the choice between 
many forms of permitted use, at different prices and under different conditions. In 
exchange, he must accept the various restrictions on use in click-wrap licenses etc. 
which are in most cases accompanied by technical protection measures to secure that he 
individually allowed scope of use will not be exceeded.
25  
It should not be ignored that the supporters of the above mentioned (untenable) 
reward theory would arrive at another conclusion, as it makes indeed no difference 
whether a work copy is sold at the sales counter or the protected content is submitted 
via the internet: in both cases the copyright owner has equally obtained the “adequate 
reward”. However, even the supporters of the reward theory admit that amongst all 
possible transaction forms, online exhaustion rules can only be applied to cases which 
are analogous to purchase at the sales counter.
26  
Exhaustion rules that apply only to a part of the possible online transactions, however, 
are likely to cause further confusion among online purchasers who are already exposed 
to a high degree of legal insecurity on the virtual market. What forms of resale should 
be allowed by the exhaustion rule and what not? May the purchaser of a virtual album 
                                                  
25 It should not be ignored that parts of the Continental European copyright community have a 
rather skeptical attitude towards the increased opportunities of right owners and work consumers to 
enter into direct transaction relationship, as the mentioned “right owners” are in most cases not the 
immediate authors but the commercial work exploiters. The above-mentioned “rough justice” of 
collective copyright management at least secured the authors stable revenue according to fixed 
distribution standards, whereas the decreasing need for collective administration due to the internet 
would expose authors to the unilateral bargaining power of the culture industry.         
26  Eric Tjong Tjin Tai (above note 24).  25
resell single music pieces or, in analogy to sale in the CD shop, only the whole album? 
Which manner of resale should be allowed, sale of tangible CD-R copies, sale through 
re-transmission etc.? In sum, online exhaustion would raise insecurity and therefore run 
counter the basic intention behind exhaustion rules, which is to safeguard smooth 
market transactions. Copyright exhaustion should therefore remain limited to the 
non-virtual world, even if it may sooner or later become obsolete, as protected contents 
are increasingly traded via the internet.     
 
 
3. Intermediate Results   
 
a) Just as patent protection, copyright protection should only be limited by exhaustion 
rules if otherwise the smooth circulation of commodities would be seriously hampered. 
b) Exhaustion rules originally target at eliminating obstacles to the market circulation of 
commodities. Therefore, they cannot be offhand applied to online transactions, where no 
commodities are sold, but contents submitted. The broad variety of possible online 
transactions renders those transactions which are equivalent to sale at the counter hardly 
distinguishable from other transaction forms. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion as 
to which extent an online purchaser may dispose of the downloaded content, the 
application of exhaustion rules should be limited to the non-virtual world in which 
clearly identifiable work copies (“commodities”) are traded. 
 
 
IV. Trademark Exhaustion  26
 
1. Origin Function and Exhaustion 
 
In economic terms, the exclusive right to mark the own product, i.e. the right to prohibit 
others from using the same sign on their products, helps to eliminate the market failure 
of information deficiencies. A mark contains plenty of information about the quality and 
features of the marked product. In other words, it enables consumers to locate the 
commodity which fits to their preferences.     
In absence of such a signaling mark, the search costs of obtaining adequate 
information would be too high. As a result, the consumers would refrain from buying a 
pig in a poke but rather rely on the only available information, which is the price. Due 
to the unavailability of quality information, they would opt for the cheapest product 
which is likely to be the one fabricated at lowest production costs and therefore to be of 
worst quality. Those suppliers who engage in costly quality competition would not be 
able to sell their products and sooner or later disappear from the market. The result 
would be a market on which only goods of uniformly bad quality are traded, with 
dissatisfied consumers and suppliers without any incentive to be good in terms of 
quality maintenance and improvement. This so-called “adverse selection” is a market 
failure and leads to a sub-optimal situation because it prevents the supply side from 
meeting the consumer’s preferences.
27  
A trademark signalizes to the consumers that the marked product stems from a 
certain centre of will
28 which stands for certain quality promises. If the trademark 
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Landes/Posner: Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 Journal of Law & Economics 265 
(1987)  
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owner does not neglect quality control, the consumers will establish certain quality 
expectations in the marked product and be ready to purchase it at a correspondingly 
high price. Especially well-known trademarks open their owners a certain pricing 
leeway, because they enjoy an exclusive market position. In this regard, the objective of 
trademark protection is not much different from that of patent and copyright protection, 
namely to secure dynamic quality competition by exempting the right owner from pure 
price competition based on information asymmetry. Just like patent and copyright 
owners, trademark owners have a huge interest in exploiting the pricing leeway arising 
from their entrepreneurial effort by differentiating prices. And just like in case of patents 
and copyright, the resale of marked products purchased at a location where they were 
put into circulation at a cheap price is an act of free riding. 
However, free riding on what? In one important aspect, trademark protection is 
substantially different from patent or copyright protection, as it does not grant its owner 
the exclusive right to put a certain product on the market, but only the exclusive right to 
attach a mark which indicates that the marked product stems from a center of will that 
guarantees for its quality. Where a marked product enjoys an exclusive position on the 
market, it is the result of the trademark owners’ exploitation of his right in the intended 
manner, but not of a right to supply the market with a certain product. Competitors are 
free to put identical but differently marked products into market circulation, unless the 
marked good is simultaneously protected by a patent or copyright. In other words, in 
contrast to a patent or copyright which rewards an already achieved result of 
outstanding innovative or creative efforts, the trademark right only lays the foundation 
for such a reward. It leaves it to the right owner to establish a monopolistic position 
                                                                                                                                                  
Markenrechtsentwicklung und Parallelimport (Development of Trademark Law and Parallel  28
which allows him to charge monopoly prices in exchange for the result of outstanding 
entrepreneurial efforts.   
The basic function of the trademark which is to indicate the origin of a certain 
commodity leaves not much room for a renunciation from the exhaustion principle. 
Once a marked product is legally put into circulation, the function of the mark to 
indicate the origin can be regarded as fulfilled, and it will not be impaired by 
subsequent acts of circulation.
29 In other words, even if circumventing the distribution 
channels established by the trademark owner can be regarded as a form of free riding, 
such free riding does not affect the subject matter protected by the trademark right. The 
interest of the trademark owner in undistorted price differentiation can therefore not be 
protected by a trademark regime that is solely based on the origin function.     
 
 
2. Is an Extension of the Scope of Trademark Functions Desirable?   
 
It should be noted that normally not only the function of origin indication, but also a 
number of other functions are attached to trademarks, like for example the “quality 
function” i.e. the function of guaranteeing to the consumer that his quality expectations 
will be met, or the “advertisement function” i.e. the function of implementing 
information about the product’s features and qualities into the consumer’s consciousness. 
Trademark owners often supply different markets with products of different quality 
under the same trademark and sell them at different prices. Arbitrage in form of 
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purchasing the (in most cases cheaper) products of low quality and offering them on a 
market which is supplied with high-quality products at a correspondingly high price 
may severely impair the goodwill associated with that trademark. Should therefore the 
quality function of a trademark, the goodwill it incorporates be protected against 
parallel imports? U.S. case law, for example, prohibits parallel imports of goods that are 
“materially different” from the domestically traded goods, mainly in order to protect 
consumers against disappointed quality expectations.
30  
Other important trademark legislations show or – until recently showed - much more 
reserved towards a protection of functions other than the origin function. Japanese case 
law, for example, looks back on a long tradition of acknowledging international 
exhaustion, with reference to the origin function as the only protected function of 
trademarks.
31 Also the Supreme Court’s recent “Fred Perry” decision of 27 February 
2003,
32 which held that imports of textiles produced under an unauthorized sublicense 
abroad could not be regarded as parallel imports of genuine goods, does not mean a 
renouncement from this view. Such import would still harm the source function of the 
trademark, as the breach of contract by the direct license partner deprived the right 
owner of the opportunity to control and maintain quality, so that the imported goods can 
no more be regarded as put into circulation with his consent.   
In the EU, the Trademark Directive of 1989 has abandoned the so-far prevailing 
principle of international trademark exhaustion. Art. 7 stipulates that “the trade mark 
shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been 
                                                  
30    E.g. Lever Bros. Co. v. U.S., 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993)   
31  Starting with the Osaka District Court’s “Parker” decision of 27 February 1970, 2 IIC 325 (1971); 
that the quality function is not directly protected by the trademark right was explicitly stated by the 
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put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his 
consent.” The ambiguously formulated provision is widely interpreted as allowing only 
parallel trade within the Community and as prohibiting parallel imports of marked 
goods from third countries to the territory of the EU.
33 However, neither the provision 
itself nor the recitals to the directive contain any further substantial hint that this partial 
renouncement from the exhaustion principle is based on any considerations with regard 
to an enlarged scope of trademark functions. Its sole objective seems to be the 
protection of the European trademark industry against the inflow of genuine goods 
which are cheaply manufactured and circulated abroad. Even though a study of 2000 
has brought to light that international exhaustion would presumably not entail 
noteworthy damage to the European industry, the EU still adheres to the regional 
exhaustion, with reference to the fact that an explicit international exhaustion rule 
would not be introducible, and that leaving the exhaustion issue to the national 
legislation of each member would cause distortions on the Internal Market.
34   
One EU member which would probably not consent in the (re-)introduction of 
worldwide trademark exhaustion is Germany. Prior to the enactment of the Trademark 
Act of 1994, German case law was quite clear in limiting the catalogue of protected 
functions to the origin function. This is best reflected by the Federal Court’s decision in 
its “Cinzano” decision of 2 February 1973,
35 that “if the mark owner himself is not 
                                                  
33 E.g. the “Silhouette” decision of the European Court of Justice of 16 July 1998, 29 IIC 920 
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obliged to maintain a constant quality, third parties can even less be expected to do so”.   
However, the overhaul of 1994 prompted a number of commentators to assume that 
also the quality function would now be directly protected and that this would necessitate 
a reorientation in the exhaustion question.
 36 They refer, inter alia, to the complete 
transferability of the trademark under the new provisions. It would therefore have lost a 
lot of its dependence on a certain business operator, which is regarded as a hint that the 
trademark is no more solely an instrument of indicating the product’s origin. A further 
hint is that trademark owners are now explicitly entitled to prescribe quality standards to 
their licensees, and circulation of products which do not meet these standards is no more 
regarded as a matter of contract breach but as trademark infringement. Here, not only 
the licensee who shows responsible for the inferior quality comes into question as 
infringer but also thirds who re-circulate the products of low quality. The same applies 
to products that the license partner circulated outside the scope agreed upon in the 
license contract - also here, third circulators may be held liable for trademark 
infringement.   
It remains doubtful, however, whether all these changes really reflect an enlargement 
of the protected trademark functions. Even if circulation of goods of inferior quality or 
circulation beyond the licensed scope now constitutes infringement, such goods cannot 
possibly be regarded as put into circulation with the consent of the right owner any more. 
In other words, their availability on the market cannot be traced back to the same 
“center of will” that has in the past performed well in terms of quality maintenance and 
improvement, and therefore infringes the origin function of the mark. Even without 
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clarifying rules at hand, the above-mentioned “Fred Perry” decision of the Japanese 
Supreme Court has arrived at a similar solution.   
In contrast to U.S. case law, the German rules remain silent on inferior goods put on 
a foreign market with the consent of the trademark owner. How to deal with parallel 
imports of such goods into markets where superior goods are sold under the same mark? 
In my opinion, there is no reason to protect the quality promise inherent in a trademark. 
To fabricate and to market products of different quality under the same trademark is at 
least no economic activity that deserves special protection. Such protection may instead 
have effects that run counter to the original intention of trademark law, which is to 
intensify quality competition by abolishing information insufficiencies, especially if we 
take into account that our global economy is not only characterized by the free 
movement of goods but also by the free movement of consumers who want to see their 
quality expectations met wherever they purchase the product of their preferred brand. 
And even in cases where not goods of “inferior” but only of “different” quality, i.e. 
adapted to national preferences, sizes, customs, etc. are traded, it should be left to the 
initiative of the trademark owner to mark the products correspondingly in order to 




3. Intermediate Results 
 
a)  The traditional function of trademark, which is to indicate that the marked product 
stems from a certain center of will, leave not much room for a control right over the 
                                                  
37  With regard to Japan, see Tamura, Shôhyôhô gaisetsu (Commentary on Trademark Law), 2
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subsequent circulation of the marked goods. In contrast to patent and copyright 
protection, trademark protection does not entitle the right owner to put a certain 
commodity exclusively into circulation but only to prohibit competitors from using 
the same mark. His monopoly position on the market is a mere consequence of 
using the trademark in the intended manner but not directly protected by the 
trademark right. In other words, the trademark right as such does not exempt him 
from price competition but only provides him with the opportunity to obtain a 
certain monopoly status, in enabling him to establish confidence among consumers 
that their quality expectations will be met. 
b)  An enlargement of the scope of trademark functions to the quality function or the 
advertisement function, i.e. a direct protection of the quality promise incorporated in 
a trademark, is at least unnecessary, if not undesirable. It should be left to 
entrepreneurial decision of the trademark owner to keep to his own quality promises. 
There is no need for legal rules that allow him to lean back and to rely on protection 
against price competition by parallel imports of inferior goods circulated by him 
under the same mark. 
 
 
V. Final Results   
 
The increasing demand for a more liberal regime over exhaustion reflects concern about 
too strong IP rights. However, far-reaching exhaustion rules as a means to correct 
possible overprotection would lack economic accuracy, not at least because they would 
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be similarly applied to both subject-matter that is indeed over-protected as well as to 
adequately protected subject-matter. A more accurate approach to this problem would be 
to reconsider the scope of protected subject-matter, whether absolute rights in mere 
information collections, business methods, shampoo bottle labels etc. are really 
necessary. However, if we consider that at least patent and copyright protection were 
originally designed to exempt right owners from price competition in order to secure a 
reward for outstanding innovative and creative efforts, we have to admit that exhaustion 
rules of any kind run counter this original legislative intention, in that they re-expose 
right owners to price competition from which the grant of IP rights originally intended 
to exempt them. Therefore, exhaustion rules should be enacted with great care and for 
the sole purpose of avoiding unduly high hedge costs and insecurity, in order to 
safeguard the overall objective behind the grant of IP rights, which is to enhance 
welfare.  
 